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INTRODUCTION 
Recent work has questioned the dichotomy between living 
constitutionalism and originalism on the ground that our 
understanding of what is “original” is itself a changing phenomenon.1 
It is not just understandings of constitutional history, however, that 
evolve over time. It is also understandings of the role that history ought 
to play in constitutional interpretation and adjudication. Indeed, the 
two evolutionary processes are intertwined in complex ways.  
In this Essay, I sketch a brief, stylized narrative explaining how 
this dynamic has played out in American constitutional theory over the 
past five decades. Although I believe this narrative to be basically 
accurate, my purpose is not to do rigorous intellectual history. Rather, 
it is to explore some of the ways that external political forces and 
shifting understandings of constitutional history shape the evolution of 
constitutional theory and vice versa. For this purpose, the precise 
factual particulars are not of great moment. What matters are the 
broad outlines and the patterns of reciprocal influence, leavened with 
a large measure of sheer contingency, that those outlines suggest.2  
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comments, I thank Howie Erlanger, Toni Massaro, and David Schwartz. 
1. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Will Lin-Manuel Miranda Transform the Supreme Court?,
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/lin-manuel-
miranda-and-the-future-of-originalism/485651 [https://perma.cc/A775-EMR7] (“[I]f the history 
of constitutional law shows anything, it is that the ‘original meaning’ of the Constitution changes 
over time.”). 
2. For a more punctilious treatment of some of the intellectual history touched on in this
Essay, see generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 
(2004) and Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). 
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The upshot is that constitutional theory, no less than constitutional 
doctrine or constitutional history, lives. It grows and changes over time, 
according to its own internal logic and through a process of reciprocal 
interaction with its environment, which includes both the ever-
changing literature of constitutional history and larger social and 
political forces. On some level, everybody knows this. But at any given 
time, it is far from the forefront of consciousness for most 
constitutional theorists. This Essay is a reminder and a call to greater 
self-consciousness. 
Three caveats deserve mention at the outset. First, my narrative is 
divided into two periods, which I call “The Era of Old Originalism” 
and “The Era of New Originalism.” I use these labels because the 
evolution of originalism over time is the central thread of my narrative, 
not to accord originalism any pride of place among constitutional 
theories. Second, I make no pretense of comprehensiveness. Nor do I 
mean to suggest that the episodes and theorists I discuss are the most 
important during the periods covered by my narrative.3 They are 
chosen principally for their illustrative value and ease of exposition. 
Third, at various points, I attribute changes in constitutional theory to 
political and ideological forces. In so doing, I do not mean to impute 
conscious ideological motives to any constitutional theorist or 
historian, unless explicitly noted. Motivated reasoning and selection 
effects in the reception and recirculation of scholarly ideas are 
probably more common pathways for politics and ideology to influence 
the evolution of an academic discipline.4 In any case, those pathways 
are fully sufficient to support the causal connections I draw between 
 
 3. Among the many important works omitted from my narrative are those of Bruce 
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, and Lawrence Lessig. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, 
VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term–Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). My narrative is also largely confined to the liberal 
democratic mainstream. There are obviously other traditions, which demonstrate the historicity 
of constitutional theory in other ways, but they are beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally, 
e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and A Jurisprudence 
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 (1991); Robin L. West, Constitutional 
Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992).  
 4. Cf. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 935–39 (2016) 
(discussing motivated reasoning in connection with the choice and application of constitutional 
theory). 
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constitutional history, politics, and constitutional theory, without any 
need for recourse to subterfuge, opportunism, or bad faith.5 
I.  THE ERA OF OLD ORIGINALISM: 1970–1996 
A. Old Originalism and Its Critics 
Circa 1970, Robert Bork launched originalism as a self-conscious 
theory of constitutional interpretation.6 He did so in response to the 
constitutional decisions of the Warren and early Burger Courts, which 
by the standards of the time, aggressively protected the rights of racial 
and religious minorities, women, and criminal defendants. Bork’s 
originalism, which held that judges interpreting the Constitution were 
bound by the original intent of its framers and ratifiers, was 
predominantly a theory of judicial restraint. Its avowed goal was to roll 
back the interventionist decisions of a liberal Supreme Court to permit 
the more conservative policy views of American voters and elected 
officials free rein.7 To promote this vision, Bork relied not only on 
widespread veneration for the founding generation, but also on a 
straightforward appeal to democratic values. Without a fixed historical 
text to restrain them, life-tenured federal judges—especially, Supreme 
Court justices—could freely substitute their own policy views for those 
of the American people and their elected representatives.8 
Bork’s argument quickly caught on with conservative lawyers and 
legal academics, many of whom, including Bork himself, were 
appointed to the federal bench by President Reagan. In the process, 
 
 5. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 
889 (1993) (“What appears to be theoretical opportunism may turn out to be so only from a 
perspective hostile to that of the accused.”). But see Pozen, supra note 4, at 935 (describing 
motivated cognition as a type of bad faith in the Sartrean sense of self-deception). 
 6. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). The roots of originalism, of course, go much further back. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (“At least since 
Marbury, in which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitution’s being 
a written document, originalism in one form or another has been a major theme in the American 
constitutional tradition.”). 
 7. Whittington, supra note 2, at 602 (“The primary commitment within [Bork’s] critical 
posture was to judicial restraint.”); id. (“As Bork and others repeatedly argued, the central 
problem of constitutional theory was how to prevent judges from acting as legislators and 
substituting their own substantive political preferences and values for those of the people and 
their elected representatives.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 6, at 11–12 (calling for reformulation of “broad areas of 
constitutional law” to prevent courts from deciding “matters of morality, of judgment, of 
prudence” that properly “belong . . . to the political community”). 
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judicial restraint—already an important theme of conservative legal 
theory and rhetoric—became inextricably bound up with originalism, 
which promised to bind judges to a historically fixed and precisely 
determinate constitutional text.9 With these twin rallying cries, a newly 
and increasingly conservative federal judiciary set about cabining, 
pruning, and in some cases, outright dismantling the liberal 
constitutional jurisprudence of their predecessors.10 In this task, they 
were powerfully aided by the rise of the conservative legal movement, 
most notably the Federalist Society, which matched conservative 
judges with like-minded law clerks; groomed and vetted future judicial 
nominees; and generally provided a forum for rigorously testing and 
honing the theory and rhetoric of constitutional conservatism.11  
For its first fifteen to twenty years, the originalist program was 
almost entirely reactive. Its overarching goal was to provide a 
theoretical and rhetorical justification for rolling back the liberal 
judicial activism of the Warren and early Burger Courts.12 In more 
concrete terms, it sought to weaken judicial remedies against racial and 
gender discrimination;13 to make life easier for police and 
 
 9. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 2, at 601 (“The primary commitment within this critical 
posture was to judicial restraint. Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation were 
understood as a means to that end.”); cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 7 (1990) (“The orthodoxy of original understanding, and 
the political neutrality of judging it requires, are anathema to a liberal culture that for fifty years 
has won a succession of political victories from the courts and that hopes for more political 
victories in the future.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (reversing a district court 
desegregation order in deference to the “vital national tradition” of local autonomy); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756, 761 (1984) (holding that the parents of black public-school children 
lacked Article III standing to challenge an IRS policy granting tax-exempt status to racially 
exclusionary private schools); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976) (deciding that the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not extend to habeas corpus); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 239–43 (1976) (finding the Equal Protection Clause was not violated by state action 
that disparately impacts racial minorities); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451 (1974) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule does not extend to the fruits of an un-Mirandized confession). 
 11. See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE 
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 135–80 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 2, at 601 (“[Old] originalism was a reactive theory 
motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren 
and Burger Courts; originalism was largely developed as a mode of criticism of those actions.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 99; Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–43; Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 271–75, 280–81 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by state 
laws that disparately impact women). 
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prosecutors;14 to permit state regulation of abortion;15 and to support 
efforts to inculcate traditional Christian religious values.16 What the 
originalist program did not seek, at this stage, was to press an 
affirmative agenda of conservative judicial activism, at least not in any 
systematic way. It was as if conservative lawyers, judges, and legal 
theorists were too preoccupied with undoing the old order to realize 
that they now held the power to impose a new order of their own. The 
commitment to judicial restraint forged in an earlier era probably also 
had some—and perhaps a substantial—constraining effect. 
Meanwhile, defenders of the Warren Court’s legacy were busily 
mounting a response to the emerging threat posed by originalism. That 
response proceeded along multiple fronts. Most important were the 
following arguments, pressed by Paul Brest and others: 
• The original intent of the founders is too remote and 
indeterminate to recover (or to meaningfully constrain judges);17  
• The founders were a “they, not an it,” with many divergent and 
conflicting intentions;18 
• The dead have no right to rule the living, especially when the dead 
in question are virtually all white men, making rules to govern a 
tiny, premodern agrarian society, heavily dependent on slave 
labor;19 
• The founders themselves were pragmatists, who hoped and 
expected that subsequent generations would adapt their 
handiwork to meet the needs of a changing society;20 
 
 14. See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 451; Stone, 428 U.S. at 494–95. 
 15. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 465 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]e must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely 
sensitive issues, such as [the regulation of abortion], ‘the appropriate forum for their resolution 
in a democracy is the legislature.’” (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977))).  
 16. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a bold 
step for this Court to seek to banish from [a public-high-school graduation] the expression of 
gratitude to God that a majority of the community wishes to make.”).  
 17. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 6, at 222 (“One need not embrace [radical skepticism about] 
historical knowledge to appreciate the indeterminate and contingent nature of the historical 
understanding that an originalist historian seeks to achieve.”).  
 18. See, e.g., id. at 215–16 (discussing the conceptual and practical difficulties of discerning 
the intentions of collective bodies). 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 225 (“We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and 
gone.”).  
 20. See, e.g., id. at 216–17 (discussing this possibility). 
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• Originalism is inconsistent with Brown v. Board of Education21 
and other landmark decisions that most modern-day Americans 
would be loath to give up.22 
Together, these arguments formed the core of an almost 
universally hostile academic response to originalism and its political 
aims, one that somewhat belied an ongoing crisis of conscience among 
many liberals over “the root difficulty . . . that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system.”23 
B. Constitutional Theory Meets Constitutional History 
The debate over originalism created an obvious opportunity for 
professional constitutional historians to weigh in, which they did in 
significant numbers. Jack Rakove’s Original Meanings, which 
emphasized the complex and contested political environment from 
which the Constitution emerged, was the most influential work of this 
sort.24 It is an excellent illustration of one way that the evolution of 
legal theory can influence the evolution of historical understandings. 
Put simply, debates among twentieth-century academic legal theorists, 
lawyers, and judges set the agenda (or at least an agenda) for 
professional historical inquiry, which in turn reshaped historical 
understandings for the next generation of historians and constitutional 
theorists. 
The influence also runs in the opposite direction. Even as Paul 
Brest and other defenders of the Warren Court’s legacy were 
developing their critique of originalism, another group of liberal and 
 
 21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 6, at 231–32 (making this point). 
 23. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). The most obvious and influential 
example of this ongoing crisis was JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that judicial review is legitimate only if limited to policing 
malfunctions of the political process, rather than imposing substantive value judgments). Of 
course, the struggle of liberals to reconcile themselves to the countermajoritarian difficulty was 
in part a hangover from the New Deal era, when the central tenet of progressive constitutional 
thought was hostility to judicial review on democratic grounds similar to those espoused by Bork 
and his originalist followers. See, e.g., Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 367–68 (2013) (discussing democracy-based skepticism of judicial 
review by Felix Frankfurter and other New Deal liberals); Whittington, supra note 2, at 601 (“It 
is an intriguing feature of conservative critiques of the Court during this era that they mirror the 
central critique of the Lochner Court favored by the New Dealers in the 1930s: that the justices 
were essentially making it up and ‘legislating from the bench.’”). 
 24. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
COAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/27/2017  12:25 PM 
2017] LIVING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 105 
left constitutional theorists was drawing on the historical literature of 
civic republicanism, in particular the work of Bernard Bailyn, Gordon 
Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock, as inspiration for an affirmative vision of 
American constitutionalism that could be invoked to support and 
expand on the Warren Court’s constitutional decisions.25 The work of 
these theorists, notably including Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein, 
is too rich and varied to be neatly summarized here. But their central 
argument is that the American constitutional tradition is not merely, 
perhaps not even predominantly, one of liberal individualism.26 It also 
contains an important and largely salutary strand of civic 
republicanism, emphasizing collective deliberation, democratic 
participation, equality, and community.27 Through “serious and 
sympathetic (but not uncritical) reflection” upon this tradition, 
theorists like Michelman and Sunstein sought to exploit its “visionary 
resources” to “invigorate a constitutional discourse” that would justify 
the preservation and extension of the Warren Court’s liberal 
constitutional jurisprudence.28  
Notably, this project was not premised on a simple embrace of the 
civic republican tradition described by historians. Because “[v]arious 
strategies of exclusion—of the nonpropertied, blacks, and women—
were built into [that] tradition,” liberal and left constitutional theorists 
seeking to exploit it were compelled to reflect critically on the role that 
history ought to play in constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication.29 Like originalists, these theorists also had to confront the 
difficulty of translating an intellectual tradition from one historical 
epoch to another. As Sunstein put it, “the task is not simply one of 
excavation. History does not supply conceptions of political life that 
 
 25. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) (“[A]n 
examination of our constitutionalism from a republican-inspired standpoint might help invigorate 
a constitutional discourse that would steel judges against the desertion of claims like 
Hardwick’s.”); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544 (1986) (“A feminine jurisprudence, instead of rejecting the 
communitarian and virtue-based framework of Jeffersonian republicanism, might embrace and 
adapt it for modern society.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1539, 1540 (1988) (“Republican thought played a central role in the framing period, and it offers 
a powerful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism.”). 
 26. See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1541–42 (making this argument). 
 27. See id. (defining the republican tradition in these terms).  
 28. Michelman, supra note 25, at 1494–96. 
 29. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1539; cf. Mark V. Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in 
Constitutional Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 94 (1987) (expressing skepticism 
about the utility of the concept a republican tradition). See generally Michelman, supra note 25 
(offering an extended argument for a rehabilitated form of republicanism). 
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can be applied mechanically to current problems.”30 Different theorists 
responded to these challenges in different ways, most of which could 
be grouped under the broad heading of “rational traditionalism.”31 The 
particulars are not especially important for present purposes. What 
matters is that the historical literature of civic republicanism not only 
provided substantive grist for constitutional theory; it also influenced 
the debate over history’s normative significance for constitutional law. 
II.  THE ERA OF NEW ORIGINALISM: 1997–2015 
A. New Originalism and Its Critics 
By the late nineties, two things had happened. First, the critiques 
of originalism had done real intellectual damage. At least within the 
academy, the damage was so severe that many liberal constitutional 
theorists were confidently pronouncing originalism dead.32 Second, 
conservative lawyers, judges, and legal theorists were beginning to 
realize their own power and were looking for rhetorical and theoretical 
justifications for using it proactively to advance conservative 
interests.33 Together, these conditions created a powerful demand for 
a new approach to constitutional decisionmaking that could both 
withstand the critiques leveled at early versions of originalism and also 
justify greater judicial activism on behalf of conservative causes. 
Over the next ten years or so, the New Originalism arose to meet 
this demand. It did not happen overnight. Randy Barnett and Keith 
Whittington were early contributors, developing original public 
meaning, the argument from writtenness, and the interpretation-
construction distinction as linchpins of the new approach.34 If the 
 
 30. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1539. 
 31. Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
891 (1996) (advocating a “rational traditionalism” that “acknowledges the claims of the past but 
also specifies the circumstances in which traditions must be rejected because they are unjust or 
obsolete”). 
 32. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611 
(1999) (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead, having been 
defeated in intellectual combat sometime in the eighties.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 2, at 604 (“[C]ontrol of the judicial majority also creates 
a need to identify what the Court should be doing in the political system, which the old originalism 
never really did.”); id. at 609 (“The new originalism does not require judges to get out of the way 
of legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also 
nothing less.”).  
 34. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWER 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 6 (1999) (drawing a distinction between interpretation and 
construction); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
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original intentions of the framers and ratifiers were inscrutable or 
impossible to aggregate, original public meaning was an objective 
linguistic fact.35 If the founders could not claim legitimate democratic 
authority to rule contemporary Americans, the commitment of those 
Americans to a written constitution as a constraint on government 
power could supply an alternative justification for originalism.36 If 
original meaning could not determinately resolve all constitutional 
controversies, constitutional construction could supplement 
constitutional interpretation to fill in the gaps.37  
The initial appeal of these innovations was theoretical and 
defensive. They enabled originalists to respond to some of the 
strongest arguments leveled against originalism by the previous 
generation of liberal constitutional theorists. In this sense, the forces 
that catalyzed originalism’s evolution were intellectual and internal to 
constitutional theory. In time, however, other advantages presented 
themselves that helped to consolidate this evolution and strongly 
influenced the future course of its development.  
Emphasis on objective public meaning, rather than the subjective 
intentions or expectations of the framers and ratifiers, gave originalists 
a plausible basis for embracing widely celebrated decisions like Brown 
and Loving v. Virginia38 that were plainly inconsistent with original 
intentions and expectations but arguably consistent with the original 
public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, defined at a 
 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 50–61 (1999) (arguing that originalism 
follows from the writtenness of the U.S. Constitution); Barnett, supra note 32 at 629–36 
(explaining original public meaning, drawing the interpretation-construction distinction, and 
arguing that originalism follows from a commitment to written constitutionalism). 
 35. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 622 (“While some originalists still search for how the 
relevant generation of ratifiers expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to 
specific cases, original meaning originalists need not concern themselves with this, except as 
circumstantial evidence . . . .”); see also Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 382 (2013) (“[T]he focus on public meaning also avoids some of the 
problems associated with uncovering collective intent.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational 
Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 416 (2013) (“Given the empirical nature of 
ascertaining original public meaning, the New Originalism ought to be practiced more rigorously 
than the old originalism.”). 
 36. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 652. 
 37. See id. at 645–46. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMM. 95 (2010) (arguing that constitutional construction and 
constitutional instruction are two distinct stages in interpreting legal text to determine its 
meaning). 
 38. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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sufficiently high level of abstraction.39 Emphasis on original public 
meaning also enabled originalists to argue that the abstract language 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause warranted judicial protection of 
a host of economic liberties, either as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation or construction.40 Here was the beginning of originalism 
as a sword, an offensive justification for judges to advance conservative 
values against a hostile democratic process. 
Further offensive potential was implicit in the argument from 
writtenness—the distinction between judicial restraint and 
constitutional constraint.41 The point of a written constitution, 
according to New Originalists, was to constrain the power of 
government, including but not limited to the power of judges. If other 
government actors exceeded the constraints imposed by that 
Constitution, it was the duty of judges acting under it to enforce those 
constraints even against more democratically accountable officials and 
institutions. In such circumstances, judicial restraint—defined as 
judicial forbearance—was not cause for celebration; it was an 
abdication of duty.42  
Only quite recently have originalists begun to elaborate on this 
argument explicitly, and its terms are still evolving. In addition to the 
contrast between judicial restraint and judicial constraint, Randy 
Barnett, Clark Neily, and others have sought to promote “judicial 
engagement” as a desirable form of judicial activism in the 
 
 39. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2381 
(2015) (noting the influence on the Court of Alexander Bickel’s argument that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally meant to be read at a high, and perhaps evolving, level of 
abstraction”). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (mounting a more traditional originalist defense of Brown). 
 40. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 193–225 (2004). 
 41. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Constraint vs. Deference: Two Possible Meanings of ‘Judicial 
Restraint,’ WASH. POST (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/06/29/constraint-vs-deference-two-possible-meanings-of-judicial-restraint 
[https://perma.cc/UM3B-T94L] (defending this distinction); see also Thomas B. Colby, The 
Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 751 (2011) (proposing the distinction in the 
context of a broader critique of New Originalism); Jack Balkin, Judicial Constraint, Judicial 
Restraint, and the New Originalism, BALKINIZATION (May 12, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2016/05/judicial-constraint-judicial-restraint.html [https://perma.cc/2MKF-CZ4A] (skeptically 
playing out the distinction’s implications for conservative and libertarian originalism). 
 42. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 2, at 609 (“The new originalism does not require judges 
to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—
nothing more, but also nothing less.”). 
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enforcement of original meaning.43 Whatever term the literature settles 
on, this principle has been latent in the New Originalism for some time. 
It played an important animating role in both Heller v. District of 
Columbia44 and National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,45 as well as other less successful conservative constitutional 
challenges.46 More than any nice theoretical distinction, it is this 
celebration of conservative judicial activism in an era of conservative 
ascendancy on the federal bench that distinguishes the New 
Originalism from the Old. 
The main liberal/left response to New Originalism has been to 
emphasize just how much ground that approach cedes in its quest for 
theoretical respectability. The ne plus ultra of this response is Jack 
Balkin’s “Living Originalism,” which attempts to demonstrate that 
original-public-meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are 
entirely consistent.47 Even Roe v. Wade,48 he contends, can be justified 
on New Originalist grounds.49 The nub of Balkin’s argument is that the 
Constitution’s original public meaning is capacious, providing only a 
bare-bones constitutional framework, which judges, elected officials, 
and social movements must and should flesh out in a continuous 
process of living constitutionalist construction.50 Having thus defined 
originalism nearly out of existence, Balkin declares himself a card-
carrying member of the club.51 
Most liberal constitutional theorists have not gone so far. Instead, 
they have argued that the New Originalism protects one flank only by 
 
 43. See generally, e.g., CLARK M. NEILY III, TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT: HOW OUR COURTS 
SHOULD ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION’S PROMISE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2013) (calling 
for courts to use judicial engagement to restore courts as the check on other branches of 
government as envisioned by the Framers); Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the 
Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012) (describing what judicial engagement is 
and how it can be used when interpreting law). 
 44. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 45. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 46. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005).  
 47. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (arguing that modern 
conceptions of civil rights and civil liberties are consistent with the Constitution’s original 
meaning).  
 48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 49. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 
(2007). 
 50. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 549, 550–59 (2009).  
 51. Id. 
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exposing the other. Original meaning is both more determinate and 
more coherent than attempts to discern the collective intent of multi-
member bodies like the Philadelphia and state ratifying conventions. It 
is also less vulnerable to dead-hand objections because original public 
meaning is so capacious that it gives the present generation a large role 
in shaping its application through constitutional construction.52  
At the same time, however, original-public-meaning originalism, 
by conceding the existence of large gaps and open areas in original 
meaning, gives up both of the principal normative claims that set Old 
Originalism apart. It fails to meaningfully constrain judges because it 
licenses free-wheeling constitutional construction of open-ended 
constitutional text without reference to original meaning. It also severs 
the content of contemporary constitutional law from the democratic 
will of those who ratified it, whose expectations and intentions New 
Originalist judges are fully permitted to ignore.53 Or so critics of New 
Originalism have contended. 
B. An Unintended Offspring 
By emphasizing the flexibility and inclusiveness of original-public-
meaning originalism, the critics of New Originalism may have 
inadvertently helped to pave the way for the latest development in 
originalist theory—positivist originalism, which argues that 
“originalism is our law.”54 In Robert Bork’s day, this idea would have 
seemed bizarre at best. Originalism was a critique of legal practice, not 
a description of it. Even well into the conservative legal ascendancy of 
the 1970s and 1980s, Antonin Scalia wrote:  
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of 
both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions 
that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the 
 
 52. See generally Colby, supra note 41, at 740–41; Peter J. Smith, How Different Are 
Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 715 (2011). 
 53. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 52, at 715; Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: 
Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 864 (2005) (“[I]f 
looking beyond the text includes constant adjustment of constitutional meaning with reference to 
changes in the common law, then this is an originalism that only a ‘living constitutionalist’ could 
love.”); see also FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 40–42 (2013).  
 54. See generally Baude, supra note 39, at 2351 (providing positive law framework for 
originalism); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817, 821 (2015) (using originalist theory to argue original meaning is the law). 
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Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges 
currently thought it desirable for it to mean.55 
But if New Originalism is fully or even mostly compatible with a 
living Constitution, as its liberal critics contend, then the claim that 
originalism is our law becomes much more plausible.56  
Decisions that were previously taken as obvious deviations from 
original intent and expectations might be at least consistent with 
original public meaning. To the extent that such decisions acknowledge 
the ultimate authority of original meaning, they might actually be taken 
to confirm that originalism is our law, even if their conclusions about 
original meaning are incorrect or insincere. This, in any case, is the 
argument of positivist originalism—a development made possible 
mostly by the internal logic of constitutional theory—but one that 
arrives just in time to be deployed by a newly reinforced conservative 
Supreme Court majority.57  
The rise of positivist originalism nicely illustrates the importance 
of intellectual forces internal to constitutional theory, as well as sheer 
contingency, in driving theoretical evolution over time. The staying 
power of this approach, I suspect, will be more strongly influenced by 
external social and political forces, especially the ideological balance 
of the Supreme Court and the pace and direction of constitutional 
change the new majority of that Court pursues.58 Time will tell, though 
 
 55. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989). 
 56. I do not mean to lay the blame (or credit) entirely at the feet of New Originalism’s critics. 
Plenty of New Originalists (and fellow travelers) have worked hard to show the consistency of 
their approach with widely admired decisions that had previously been thought inconsistent with 
originalism. See generally David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (2015) (offering an 
originalist defense of Loving v. Virginia’s invalidation of anti-miscegenation laws); Michael B. 
Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 
13-115 Apr. 3, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2244610 [https://perma
.cc/5KFD-68M4] (offering a new originalist defense of Brown v. Board of Education and the 
colorblindness principle that has animated the Court’s modern affirmative action cases). 
 57. It might seem that the inclusive definition of originalism adopted by the positivists to 
render their descriptive claims plausible would deprive their argument of all critical edge, but they 
have developed ingenious arguments to the contrary. See Baude, supra note 39, at 2371 (“[T]he 
point is to look to how the Supreme Court justifies its rulings, as evidence of what counts as a 
legally sufficient justification in our current system of constitutional law.”); Sachs, supra note 54, 
at 820 (“What matters for our understanding of the law isn’t just everyday practice, but the 
premises that are implicit in our legal arguments, the claims about the structure of our law that 
we’re willing publicly to accept and defend.”). 
 58. Compare Eric Posner, Why Originalism Will Fade, ERICPOSNER.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), 
http://ericposner.com/why-originalism-will-fade [https://perma.cc/HZL6-6H6V] (arguing that a 
dearth of originalist Supreme Court justices will kill academic originalism), with Jack Balkin, Why 
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the confirmation of a vocally originalist junior justice augurs well for 
the future of originalism in general.59  
C. Constitutional Theory Meets Constitutional History 
Besides launching the career of positivist originalism, the debate 
over New Originalism has reopened, or at least reoriented, the 
dialogue between constitutional theory and history. One element of 
this dialogue is methodological, with intellectual historians vigorously 
disputing the possibility of recovering the original meaning of the 
constitutional text without a full-blown analysis of its intellectual 
context.60 Another element focuses on the content of original public 
meaning. The rise of New Originalism has spawned a cottage industry 
of “originalist histories,” whose self-professed object is to discover the 
linguistic or communicative content of the constitutional text that New 
Originalism recognizes as legally authoritative.61 Such histories span a 
wide range of constitutional provisions and exhibit at least some 
ideological diversity, as liberal critics attempt to turn the precepts of 
New Originalism to their own ends.62 In both of these respects, 
 
Originalism Will Not Fade Away, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 19, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2016/02/why-originalism-will-not-fade-away.html [https://perma.cc/H4H8-PVDY] (“Originalism 
rests on powerful forces in American politics and culture. Those forces will not fade away any 
time soon.”). Balkin has the better of this exchange, but the implications of his argument for 
positivist originalism specifically are unclear. 
 59. See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Originalism in Constitutional Time, LEGAL THEORY BLOG 
(Apr. 8, 2017), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/04/originalism-roundup-the-case-for-
the-constraint-principle-and-much-else.html [https://perma.cc/LHL6-PXRF] (“Gorsuch’s 
appointment assures the originalism will continue to occupy center stage in public and judicial 
debates over constitutional theory.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: 
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 755 (2013) (“If legal 
scholars and judges wish to continue to make serious claims about what the Constitution meant 
in the Founding era, they will need to master the basic methods of intellectual history.”); G. 
Edward White, Intellectual History and Constitutional Decision Making, 101 VA. L. REV. 1165, 
1175 (2015) (“[I]f one is interested in recovering the communicative content of a constitutional 
provision enacted in a past epoch, the methods of intellectual history would be extremely 
useful.”). But see Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1111, 1157 (2015) (contesting these claims, primarily on the ground that constitutional 
interpretation and intellectual history are concerned with different types of meaning). 
 61. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (2001); Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, 
The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. F. 180 (2014); Rappaport, supra note 56; Upham, supra 
note 56. 
 62. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New 
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1561–70 (2011) (collecting examples). See generally Jack M. 
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constitutional theory has set an agenda for constitutional history, 
though many originalist histories would not earn the plaudits of 
professional historians.63 
As in the Era of Old Originalism, the influence also runs in the 
other direction. Even as Jack Balkin and other liberal theorists were 
critically engaging with New Originalism, another group of liberal and 
left constitutional theorists was drawing on (and contributing to) the 
historical literature on popular constitutionalism in an effort to wrest 
interpretive authority from a newly ascendant—and assertive—
conservative judiciary.64  
The work of these theorists is too wide-ranging to adequately 
summarize here. Their central normative claim, however, is that, in one 
way or another, the people themselves are entitled to exercise “active 
and ongoing control over the interpretation and enforcement of 
constitutional law.”65 Drawing on a wide range of historical materials, 
theorists like Larry Kramer, Reva Siegel, and Robert Post explicitly 
advanced this claim in response to the increasingly assertive 
conservative judicial activism of the Rehnquist Court in the late 1990s, 
especially its invalidation of legislation enacted under the remedial 
powers granted to Congress by the Reconstruction Amendments.66  
 
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009) (using precepts of New Originalism to argue for 
expansive congressional commerce power). 
 63. See, e.g., Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History, PROCESS (Mar. 20, 
2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history [https://perma.cc/RG7H-36V4] 
(criticizing New Originalists for “fundamentally fail[ing] to understand what historians do.”). Of 
course, this may say as much about the historians as it does about originalists. See Randy Barnett, 
Challenging the Priesthood of Professional Historians, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-
priesthood-of-professional-historians/?utm_term=.0cacd111b4b8 [http://perma.cc/655Q-HJEH] 
(“If all you have is the historical method–as defined by Professor Gienapp–then the meaning of 
‘meaning’ must be reduced to the import or purpose of a constitutional provision, not the 
communicative content of what it said.”). I do not take sides here. 
 64. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing that the Court should reflect 
popular will when interpreting the Constitution); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (challenging judicial review and judicial supremacy); Robert C. 
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) (arguing for 
policentric constitutional interpretation). 
 65. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 959 
(2004). 
 66. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Post & Siegel, supra note 64. 
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Like the republican revival of the 1980s, the popular 
constitutionalist project was not premised on a simple embrace of a 
legal tradition described by historians (or by legal scholars acting as 
historians). Some popular constitutionalist work is almost completely 
normative, engaging only indirectly, if at all, with the historical 
literature.67 Other work combines the normative and historical in a 
number of different ways. Larry Kramer offers an original historical 
account of what he understands as a lost popular constitutionalist 
tradition, together with a passionate normative argument for 
reclaiming it.68 In a more sanguine and also a more comprehensive 
historical account, Barry Friedman argues that popular 
constitutionalism has always and, in some sense, inevitably defines the 
American constitutional tradition—and it’s a good thing, too.69 Reva 
Siegel and Robert Post offer a descriptive account of the pathways by 
which social movements—especially, the Civil Rights and Women’s 
Movements—have historically influenced the development of 
constitutional doctrine, which they then deploy to criticize the 
Rehnquist Court’s pretensions to interpretive supremacy.70  
To summarize, and to oversimplify significantly, the relationship 
between the history and theory of popular constitutionalism is 
recursive. History sets the agenda for theory, which in turn sets the 
agenda for history, which sets the agenda for theory, and so on. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional theory lives. It evolves over time through a process 
of reciprocal interaction with its environment, as well as its own 
 
 67. The best example is Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
YALE L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) (arguing “that judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode 
of final decisionmaking in a free and democratic society”). For further criticism of final judicial 
decisionmaking, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999) and JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
 68. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, supra note 64 (describing a now-defunct populist 
constitutional tradition). 
 69. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(2009) (analogizing the relationship between the Court and the public to that of a marriage 
whereby both parties contribute to the direction of the relationship). 
 70. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003); see also Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001). 
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internal logic. Sheer contingency also plays an important role. The 
narrative sketched above is far from comprehensive, but it illustrates 
this process in broad brush.  
In advancing these claims, I take no position on the larger question 
of whether there is “any set of political or constitutional principles that 
might remain as fixed standards for all the others, and against which all 
others might be judged[.]”71 Certainly some constitutional theorists 
understand themselves as seeking such transcendent principles. Others 
see their search in more pragmatic and contextual terms. Either way, 
the complex evolution of constitutional theory over time carries an 
important lesson. For those chasing eternal verities, it is vital to 
remember that every seeker inevitably approaches the search from a 
particular historical vantage point, with attendant biases, blind spots, 
and unconscious assumptions. For those with more terrestrial 
ambitions, the complex evolutionary processes described in this Essay 
are the whole ballgame. To play well, it is helpful to remember what 
game you are playing. 
 
 
 71. Balkin, supra note 5, at 870. 
